Legal Preparedness in the Time of Coronavirus

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International Policy and Estate Planning: Foreign Distributees in the Crosshairs

Article 16 of the New York’s Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act deals with foreign estates.  The legislative purpose for the enactment of the procedure with respect to foreign estates includes the following:  “If the law of such jurisdiction does not provide for the appointment of a fiduciary but vests the property of a decedent in a person or persons subject to the obligation to pay the decedent’s debts and expenses and the legacies bequeathed in his will or the distributive shares provided by law, such a person shall be recognized as the person acting therein to administer the decedent’s estate in accordance with the law thereof, but only if such person has complied with all the requirements of such jurisdiction to entitle him to receive the property of the decedent and is acting or will act there to administer the estate“ (underlining my own).  What may seem to be at first glance a benign statement can yield unanticipated complications, particularly if foreign policy is diametrically opposed to the wishes of the testator.

In re Estate of Gyfteas, 59 Misc. 2d 977, 300 N.Y.S.2d 913, 1968 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 993 (Surrogate’s Court of New York, New York County December 12, 1968), the testator was a Greek citizen and domiciliary who owned property in New York.  His Will named three executors and devised some monetary bequests, with the residuary going to charity.  Since the decedent did not have a valid New York Will, an administration proceeding was begun by one of the executors for the property in New York.  Then the legatees filed a separate petition for letters of administration for the New York property claiming that the executors had no right to distribute the New York-based assets.

N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1604(1) establishes a priority list as to the granting of ancillary letters with respect to a foreign testator’s property in New York:

(a) The person expressly appointed in the will as executor with respect to property located within this state.

(b) The person to whom domiciliary letters have been issued or if domiciliary letters are not issued, the person appointed in the will to administer all property wherever located.

(c) The person acting in the domiciliary jurisdiction to administer and distribute the testator’s estate.

(d) A person entitled under this act to letters of administration c.t.a.

Since the Will was a Greek Will, the New York court looked to the law of Greece to determine whether the named executors in the Will had the authority under SCPA § 1604 to qualify for ancillary letters.  A hearing was held on this issue.  Under Greek law, where a Will contains a charitable bequest, only the executor may distribute the assets.  Where there are no charitable bequests, the powers of the executor are subordinate to those of the legatee(s).  Citing Greek law, experts for both the petitioners and the respondents agreed on this point.  Thus, under New York law and the priorities established under SCPA § 1604(1), the executor under the Greek Will was granted ancillary letters in preference to the legatees.  However, the court stipulated that no assets from New York could be moved to Greece without further order of the court and notice to the legatees.

In part, this result was possible because the United States has diplomatic relations with Greece.  But what happens when the legatees reside in a country where State Department regulations circumscribe what the courts may do?

In re Estate of Mitzkel, 36 Misc. 2d 671, 233 N.Y.S.2d 519, 1962 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2467 (Surrogate’s Court of New York, Kings County October 15, 1962 ), the decedent, a New York resident of Lithuanian descent, left his New York estate to his two sisters, both citizens and residents of Lithuania.  At the time, Lithuania had been annexed by the Soviet Union.   The Consul General of Lithuania at New York filed a petition in Surrogate’s Court on behalf of the Lithuanian nationals.  Thereafter, the sisters were transported 500 miles from Lithuania to Moscow where they executed a power of attoney before the U.S. Consul in Moscow appointing a New York law firm to represent them in Surrogate’s Court.   Based on this power of attorney, the Soviet government had  hired attorneys in New York to represent the interests of the sisters.  These attorneys then filed a notice of appearance with the court.   The Consul General of Lithuania then filed a motion seeking to have declared as invalid the sisters’ power of attorney executed to the Soviet government and the notice of appearance by their attorneys.

At issue was the validity of the power of attorney.  Several factors pointed to the illegitimacy of the Soviet power of attorney.  First, the instrument stated that the sisters lived in the U.S.S.R instead of Lithuania.  Second, the sisters were illiterate and could not have understood the contents of the power of attorney.  Third, the sisters had been forced the travel from their homes under duress by Soviet officials.  Fourth, the services of the law firm had been illegally procured by an agent of the Soviet Union, namely a lawyers’ collective called the “Iniurcolleguia” and described as being “an essential force in subjecting the common people of Russia to the dictator’s power” (Wash. U. L. Q., supra, June, 1958, p. 252), and “tools of the State” (48 Cal. L. Rev., supra, pp. 794-795).  In the instant case, the goal of the Soviet lawyers’ collective was to extract fees from the sisters to be deposited into a common treasury used to pay these Soviet lawyers.

The United States never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) into the Soviet Union.  In a letter dates March 26, 1948, the State Department had cautioned each State governor not to give access to the Surrogate’s Court (or its State equivalent) to any Soviet officials or their attorneys for the settling of estates of decedents from Baltic States dying in the U.S.  The Surrogate’s Court found this sufficient to declare the Soviet power of attorney invalid as well as the notice of appearance by the New York attorneys representing  the “Iniurcolleguia.”

If you would like to discuss your own personal situation with me, you can get a free 30-minute consultation simply by filling out this contact form.   I will get back to you promptly.

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When a Contentious Probate Litigation Leads to a Disadvantageous Result

As is often the case, probate litigation can quickly become contentious, especially when competing Wills are offered for probate.  Litigation can become costly, and disadvantageous errors in judgment and strategy can result in unintended consequences.

In Re Matter of Harper (2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1073; 2019 NY Slip Op 50333(U) ; 63 Misc. 3d 1203(A); 2019 WL 1281833), an initial probate proceeding was begun on March 24, 2010, almost 15 months after the death of the testator on December 31, 2008, to probate a Will dated May 27, 1997.  In that Will, the decedent, himself an attorney, left his real estate and other tangible property to be divided equally among two nephews, his sister, and his three sons.  The residuary estate was left to his wife.  Objections to probate were then filed by his wife, his three sons, and his daughter Faith through a guardian ad litem.

However, this probate proceeding was stayed pending the outcome of another probate proceeding, this time for a Will dated September 25, 2007.  For over a decade thereafter, the parties engaged in costly litigation over the validity of the 2007 Will.  Only a copy of the 2007 Will existed, dated March 6, 2006.  Decedent’s wife filed for summary judgment, arguing that the later Will revoked the 1997 Will, though she did not argue for the admission to probate of the 2007 Will.  On January 30, 2018, the court denied the wife’s summary judgment motion.

One of the decedent’s sons who would have benefited from the real estate provision in the 1997 Will then brought another summary judgment motion, nearly identical to the wife’s, asking that the court find that the 2006 copy of the Will revoked the 1997 Will.  Decedent’s sister and her son, both non-distributees under the 2006 copy, objected to the summary judgment motion on the basis that “that production of the copy of the “unauthenticated” 2006 will is ‘simply a ploy to plunge the Estate into Administrative chaos.’”  The court wryly noted:  “This last argument is made apparently as a result of amnesia regarding the last ten years of family conflict and litigation.” 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1073, at 3; 2019 NY Slip Op 50333(U) at 2.

In order to succeed on a summary judgment motion to revoke a prior Will as a matter of law, the objectant must make a prima facie case that  a) the  instrument was properly executed;  b) the decedent had testamentary capacity at that time; c)  the Will  presented is a true and complete copy of the original; d)  the instrument by its terms revoked the prior Will;  and  e) that the earlier Will was intentionally revoked by the decedent (see EPTL § 3-4.1).

In support of his summary judgment motion, the son offered the following evidence: 1) a copy of the Will allegedly drafted by the decedent himself who was an attorney; 2) a showing that the Will was executed in the presence of two attesting witnesses; 3) the attestation clause included in the Will; 4) a contemporaneous self-proving affidavit; and 5) deposition transcripts of the two attesting witnesses and the notary to the 2006 Will.  One of the attesting witnesses was himself an attorney.  Both attesting witnesses testified to the decedent’s testamentary capacity and that the signatures on the copy were indeed genuine.

The court then explicitly noted this:  “As probate of the 2006 instrument as a lost will is not being sought.”  The question is why not?  Did the son not know that he could make the application to the court to probate a lost Will?  Why seeks a revocation of a prior Will without first seeking to probate the 2006 copy?

Here is why these questions matter.  Ff successful, by using the 2006 copy of the Will as a tool to only revoke the 1997 Will, the outcome would be that the decedent legally died without a Will and that New York’s intestacy statute (EPTL 4-1.1) would then apply to decedent’s estate.  Decedent’s wife is entitled to receive the following in intestacy:

1. Cash or cash equivalents, including bank accounts of up to $25,000.
2. One car of up to $25,000 (if the value of the car is greater than $25,000, the spouse has the option of paying the difference to the estate).
3. Household items, including the decedent’s clothes, furniture, appliances, and jewelry up to $20,000.
4. The decedent’s family pictures, books, computers, discs, and software, up to $2,500.

The surviving spouse also receives $50,000 in assets and 1/2 of the remainder of the estate if the decedent left children.  If there are surviving children, each child then shares equally in the other ½ remainder of the estate.  In this case, only the wife and decedent’s seven children would benefit in intestacy.  Decedent’s sister and nephews receive nothing under intestacy.

However, assuming that the 2006 copy recited essentially the same provisions or perhaps even more favorable provisions for the son, then the son could have sought to admit the copy as a lost Will under SCPA 1407.  Successful admission of the copy to probate would have meant that the 1997 would have been revoked, which seems to have been the desired outcome, and that the estate would not have gone into intestacy.  The requirements for admission of an instrument as a lost Will are the following:

  1. Due execution of the Will, including proof of testamentary capacity;
  2. No subsequent revocation of the Will;
  3. A copy or draft of the Will proved to be true or, if there is no copy or draft of the Will, then all of the provisions of the Will must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses.

The son’s summary judgment motion contained all of the elements necessary to state a prima facie case for a lost Will.  Was it a deliberate choice to not do so, or simply a legal oversight? Since he and the other litigants had already spent time and money arguing for the probate of the September 25, 2007 Will that had been denied probate, did he deem it likely that this would be the result of a lost Will petition? Or did the new depositions make it more likely that a lost Will petition might succeed? Was the point of his summary judgment motion simply to defeat his aunt and cousins even at the expense of receiving less in intestacy than even under the 1997 Will?

We will never know.  The court found that the May 27, 1997 Will was revoked by copy the 2006 Will dated March 6, 2006.  As a result, the court found that the decedent has died intestate (without a Will).

If you would like to discuss your own personal situation with me, you can get a free 30-minute consultation simply by filling out this contact form.   I will get back to you promptly.

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When Estate Planning Goes Awry: Ambiguous Beneficiary Designations on Testamentary Substitutes

Beneficiary designations appear most often in insurance contracts, retirement plans, and annuity contracts.  These contracts are known as  testamentary substitutes because they pass outside of the probate estate. The insured or annuitant is asked to designate both the primary beneficiary(ies) and the contingent beneficiaries.  We will examine a case where an issue of construction with respect to the primary beneficiaries required Surrogate Court intervention.

On March 10, 1989, Archibald Foley executed a Will in which he divided the residuary estate as follows:  “…shall be divided into six (6) equal shares․ one each of those shares to each of my brothers and/or sisters who shall survive me and one share to be divided equally between my niece, Carmel Foley, and my nephew, Lawrence Foley, or their survivor.   If neither of them survive me or if any of my brothers and sisters shall fail to survive me, then I direct such share as would have gone to them to be divided equally amongst those brothers and sisters who do survive me.”

On March 13, 1989, Dr. Foley changed the beneficiary designation on four 20-year guaranteed retirement annuities with a combined date-of-death value of $275,872.75 to read:   “to be divided equally, share & share alike among my living brothers and sisters, and one share to be divided equally between my niece (Carmel Foley) & nephew Lawrence Foley.’  Then on March 20, 1989, Foley designated the primary beneficiary under his defined contribution retirement plan with a date-of-death value of $709,380.04 to read:  “to be divided in equal shares among my living brothers and sisters-and an equal share to be divided between my niece Carmel Foley and my nephew Lawrence Foley.” He did not designate contingent beneficiaries under either the retirement annuities or the defined contribution retirement plan.  Foley’s Will was admitted to probate on April 7, 1998 (In re Estate of Foley, 181 Misc. 2d 258, 693 N.Y.S.2d 843, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 241 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. May 24, 1999)) [http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-surrogates-court/1444422.html]

By the time Archibald Foley died, all of the primary beneficiaries under the annuities and the retirement plan had died except for his sister Edna and his niece Carmel.  The executor of Foley’s Will sought a judicial ruling as to how to distribute the proceeds, particularly the 1/4 share to his predeceased nephew Lawrence.

As it turned out, this was an issue of first impression for the New York County Surrogate’s Court.  ” No authority has been discovered which addresses whether a predeceased beneficiary’s share under a retirement plan or annuity contracts passes to the estate of decedent or to the surviving beneficiaries.” Basing its analysis on prior analogous cases (The New York City Fire Department Life insurance Fund and totten trust accounts), the court reasoned that where beneficiaries were designated as individuals (Carmel and Lawrence) and not as a class (my living brothers and sisters), then they took as tenants in common and not joint tenants with right of survivorship. “Here, Mr. Foley did not expressly declare a joint tenancy in the beneficiary designation of either the retirement plan or the annuities.   Nor does the Court find the evidence that Mr. Foley intended for Lawrence Foley’s proceeds to pass to the surviving beneficiary, Carmel Foley, to be sufficiently clear.  Thus, the Court is required to hold that a tenancy in common has been created.  [See EPTL 6-2.2(a) ]. Accordingly, Lawrence Foley’s share of the proceeds from the retirement plan and the annuities are to be distributed to the estate of Mr. Foley.”  The Will then governed the distribution of Lawrence’s share, being the only document with express instructions as to predeceased relatives.  Thus a non-probate asset became a testamentary asset subject to probate.

The court was sensitive to the fact that this holding may have disrupted the intent of Mr. Foley’s estate plan, but in the absence of express declarations and named contingent beneficiaries, and the ambiguity of the language used to create the primary beneficiary designations, this was the only possible result.  Yet the court was aware that this was an anomalous result: “In the absence of legislation reversing the general common law presumption in the context of retirement plans, annuity contracts and other testamentary substitutes, modern thinking as to presumed intent cannot be extended to these assets.   This anomaly merits consideration and therefore is referred to the EPTL-SCPA Advisory Committee for such action as it deems appropriate.”

The lesson here is clear:  the drafting of beneficiary designations on testamentary substitutes needs to be done with great care.  Moreover, you should safeguard even your testamentary substitutes by having a Will with clear bequest, beneficiary, and residuary estate language.

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Alexander Hamilton, Trusts and Estates Attorney, Part 3

“What are the rights of the individuals composing a society and living under the protection of the government when a revolution occurs, a dismemberment takes place, and when new governments are formed and new relations between the government and the people are established?”  This was the pressing question asked by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1830 as it considered a case arising from the Last Will and Testament of Robert Randall containing testamentary trust for the establishment of Sailor’s Snug Harbor that Alexander Hamilton had drafted.

New York has always been known as the city of immigrants.  It was so when Alexander Hamilton arrived in New York, then known as the Province of New York and a British proprietary colony. Alexander Hamilton’s role in the Revolutionary War and in the founding of the United States is now well-known.  Less well-known is the complex history of New York from the time of the Declaration of Independence until the British retaking of the city in September of 1776, and the occupation of New York by the British until the retaking of the city by George Washington’s Continental Army on November 25, 1783.  During those tumultuous times, loyalists and revolutionaries considered themselves citizens of New York.  But who was a citizen and who was an alien?  Who had the right to inherit property?

Revolution in New York had begun before the Declaration of Independence.  On May 22, 1775, a group of local revolutionary representatives calling themselves the New York Provincial Congress had declared themselves the government of New York.  But New York was also home to Loyalists, colonists born in New York who remained loyal to the British Crown.  New York was the only colony not to vote for independence on July 4, 1776 and only endorsed the Declaration of Independence five days later.  About a third of the population of New York considered themselves Loyalists.  One of them was Bishop Charles Inglis.  From 1773 until the British defeat in 1783, Charles Inglis had been the rector of Trinity Church.  He resigned his post in 1783 and, like many Loyalists, emigrated to Nova Scotia where in 1788 he founded King’s College in Windsor, Nova Scotia.  Charles Inglis never returned to New York.  He had a son, John Inglis, who was born in New York in 1776 but who emigrated to Nova Scotia with his father.  John Inglis was ordained deacon by his father in 1801 and  became Rector of St, Paul’s in Halifax, Nova Scotia in 1816.  In 1826, John Inglis became the third Bishop of Nova Scotia.  Thereafter, he began a legal challenge to reclaim his rights to Robert Randall’s estate.

In the record of the U.S. Supreme Court case of Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor (28 U.S. 99 (1830)),  John Inglis stated an uncontroverted claim to be related to Robert Richard Randall through Margaret Inglis, his mother, who was a descendant of John Crooke, the common ancestor of Robert Richard Randall, Catherine Brewerton, and Paul R. Randall.  But was kinship sufficient to claim an inheritance under Randall’s Will?  John Inglis had been born in New York before the Declaration of Independence, and he had lived in New York prior to the British re-occupation in September 1776.  As a child, he had emigrated with his father to Nova Scotia, his mother having died while the family lived in New York.  Did his birth on New York soil alone establish his right to inherit under Robert Randall’s Will and nullify the Sailor’s Snug Harbor Trust?

In his opinion, Justice William Johnson, who had been appointed to the Court by Thomas Jefferson, held that “(A) person born in New York before 4 July, 1776, and who remained an infant with his father in the City of New York during the period it was occupied by the British troops, his father being a loyalist and having adhered to the British government and left New York with the British troops, taking his son with him, who never returned to the United States, but afterwards became a bishop of the Episcopal Church in Nova Scotia; such a person was born a British subject, and continued an alien, and is disabled from taking land by inheritance in the State of New York.” This property and inheritance holding would be used to control both immigration and property ownership throughout the 19th century in New York.  Currently, New York’s SCPA § 2218 provides a procedure for aliens to inherit money or property located in New York.

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Recovery of Lost or Stolen Art: The Case of the Missing Lipchitz

Jacques Lipchitz was a Lithuanian-born Cubist sculptor best known for abstract “transparent” sculptures.  He moved to Paris in 1909 to study at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts and thereafter joined a group of artist that included Pablo Picasso and Amedeo Modigliani.  He became a French citizen in 1924.  When the Nazis began to occupy Paris during WWII, Lipchitz who was Jewish fled France to escape deportation to the death camps.  He arrived in the US as an asylum seeker and eventually settled in 1949 in New York State in the town of Hastings-on-Hudson in Westchester County.

In 1928-29 while still in Paris, Lipchitz sculpted an erotic piece originally titled “The Couple.”  Considered shocking when it was first exhibited in Paris in 1929, Lipchitz change the title to the more ambiguous “The Cry” in order to later exhibit the sculpture in Amsterdam.  The sculpture kept this title when Lipchitz imported it to the US in order to avoid confiscation as pornography by American customs authorities.

In 1948, Lipchitz married Yulla Halberstadt, also a sculptor, with whom he had his only child Lolya. After Lipchitz died in 1973, his wife Yulla took up with a self-styled psychic and music producer Biond Fury (who also once owned John Lennon’s white suit that Lennon wore on the Abbey Road album cover) and lived with him for the last 17 years of her life until 2003.

In 1997 Yulla made an inter vivos gift to Fury of “The Cry” by inscribing the following handwritten message on the back of a photo of the sculpture:   “I gave this sculpture, ‘The Cry’ to my good friend, Biond Fury in appreciation for all he did for me during my long illness. With love and warm wishes for a Happy Future, Yulla Lipchitz/Oct. 2, 1997, New York.”  Fury subsequently sold his interest in “The Cry” in 2005 to Toronto art collector David Mirvish for $220,000.  Mirvish then sought delivery of the sculpture to Toronto.

Unbeknownst to both Fury and Mirvish, Hanno Mott, Yulla’s son by a first marriage and her executor, had loaned the sculpture to the Tuilleries Gardens in Paris in 1998, unaware of the gift.  Neither Fury nor Mirvish had any idea that the sculpture was no longer in New York.  Mott further claimed that he had sold the sculpture to the Marlborough International Fine Art Establishment, along with two other sculptures, for $1 million. 

To determine the rightful ownership of “The Cry,” Mott commenced an action in New York County Surrogate’s Court against Mirvish.   Mirvish  filed a cross motion for summary judgment asking that the court find the decedent’s inter vivos gift to be valid.  Mirvish also sued Mott in Supreme Court for replevin and conversion to recover possession of the sculpture.

The Surrogate’s Court ruled in favor of Mirvich, finding that the inter vivos gift to Fury had been completed, and that Fury thus has the right to sell his interest to Mirvish.  Mott appealed the decision and the Appellate Division, First Department found in Mott’s favor, finding that Mirvish’s claims in replevin and conversion were time-barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations and that the accrual on the Statute of Limitations began on the date that the conversion tool place, that is, on the date when the sculpture left New York for the Tuilleries Gardens in 1998.  In essence, the court found that Mirvish was too late in filing his claims.  The fact that neither Fury nor Mirvish had any knowledge that “The Cry” had been transported to Paris was immaterial. Mirvish appealed.

The New York Court of Appeals disagreed with the First Department.  The Court found that Fury’s possession of the photo with the handwritten note by Yulla meant that Yulla’s inter vivos gift to Fury had been “delivered.”  Thus all of the elements of an inter vivos gift had been satisfied:  a present transfer; a delivery of the gift, and acceptance by Fury.  Fury thus had every right to sell his interest to Mirvish who was indeed the rightful owner of the sculpture.

What lessons can we learn from this case?  First, one’s executor should be made aware of any inter vivos gifts, including artworks.  Mott, who was an attorney, would not on behalf of the Lipchitz family have loaned the sculpture or sold it to Marlborough had he been made aware of the gift. Second, to avoid having a claim for lost or stolen art dismissed because of a statute of limitations, it is best to file a claim for replevin and conversion as soon as the artwork is found missing.  And third, a buyer of artwork should examine the provenance of the artwork carefully, noticing any gaps or suspicious ownership claims.  

If you would like to discuss your own personal situation with me, if lost or stolen artwork is part of an estate,  or you would like to make an inter vivos gift  tailored to your needs, you can get a free 30-minute consultation simply by filling out this contact form. I will get back to you promptly.

Alexander Hamilton, Trusts and Estates Attorney: Part 2

In June 1801, Hamilton was summoned to the deathbed of Robert Richard Randall who resided in a mansion and farm called Minto.  Minto Farm, located at Broadway between Eighth and Tenth Street in what is now Greenwich Village, sat on 21 acres with a mansion and other buildings.  Hamilton had once owned part of the property in partnership with John Jay and Isaac Roosevelt before selling the parcel to Baron Poellitz in 1787. In 1790 Robert Randall had purchased the farm and mansion formerly owned by the British Andrew Eliot, Collector of the Port, from Anne Stuart, baronne  von Poellnitz, the wife of Frederick Charles Hans Bruno, baron von Poellnitz.  Hamilton had also been involved in the sale and purchase of the property by Randall because he managed the Poellnitz’s affairs in the United States.

Hamilton was counsel to Randall’s sister Catharine Brewerton, and it is likely through that relation that he was asked by Robert to draft his Will.   In addition, Randall knew that Hamilton shared his philanthropic vision for the support of aging sailors.   George Washington, Hamilton, and Randall were all members of the very prestigious Marine Society.  Hamilton, John Marshall (who would become Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and who would play a part later in this story), and Leonard Lispenard (a wealthy merchant and large landowner of what is now TriBeCa, and commemorated by street names for both his first and last names) all served as presidents of the Marine Society that had been founded by Robert’s father, Captain Thomas Randall.

Captain Thomas Randall had made his fortune as a privateer (or buccaneer), a private person authorized by a government to attack and plunder enemy ships during wartime.  Thomas Randall had been a part owner of “La Jeune Babe” from 1773-1776 with Stephen Girard, who personally saved the U.S. Government from financial collapse during the War of 1812 and one of the wealthiest people at the time. Thomas Randall died in 1797 after a long maritime, governmental (he was Vice-Consul to China), and philanthropic career.  He had been the founder of the Marine Society in New York for the relief of sailors and their families.  Upon his death, his fortune was distributed in large part to his three children:  Paul R. Randall, Catharine Brewerton, and Robert Richard Randall.

It came as no surprise to Hamilton then that Robert Randall chose to leave his fortune in trust for the purpose of maintaining and supporting aging sailors.  But what Hamilton did next was pure genius:  he drafted a perpetual testamentary charitable trust that would be made viable by an act of the state legislature, thereby creating a road map for the legislature to transfer property for charitable purposes without the use of confiscation or eminent domain.  In addition, this Will provision established the private right of an individual to transfer property to a charitable corporation.  The charity would be created for the benevolent purpose of supporting fifty or more aging sailors from the proceeds of the rents from the residuary estate.   Here is the genius clause in its entirety:

“Sixthly.  As to and concerning all the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, I give, devise, and bequeath the same unto the Chancellor of the State of New- York, the Mayor and Recorder of the city of New- York, the President of the Chamber of Commerce in the city of New- York, the President and Vice President of the Marine Society of the city of New-York, the senior Minister of the Episcopal Church in the said city, and the senior Minister of the Presbyterian Church in the said city ; to have and to hold, all and singular the said rest, residue, and remainder of my said real and personal estate, unto them, the said Chancellor of the State of New- York, Mayor of the city of New- York, the Recorder of the city of New-York, the President of the Chamber of Commerce, President and Vice President of the Marine Society, senior Minister of the Episcopal Church, and senior Minister of the Presbyterian Church in the said city, for the time being, and their respective successors in the said offices, forever, to, for, and upon the uses, trusts, intents, and purposes, and subject to the direction and appointments hereinafter mentioned, and declared concerning the same ; that is to say, out of the rents, issues and profits of the said rest, residue, and remainder of my said real and personal estate, to erect and build upon some eligible part of the land upon which I now reside, an Asylum, or Marine Hospital, to be called ” The Sailors’ Snug Harbor,” for the purpose of maintaining and supporting aged, decrepit, and worn-out sailors, as soon as they, my said charity Trustees, or a majority of them, shall judge the proceeds of the said estate will support fifty of the said sailors, and upwards. And I do hereby direct, that the income of the said real and personal estate, given as aforesaid to my said charity Trustees, shall forever hereafter be used and applied for supporting the Asylum or Marine Hospital hereby directed to be built, and for maintaining sailors of the above description therein, in such manner as the said Trustees, or a majority of them, may, from time to time, or their successors in office may, from time to time, direct. And it is my intention, that the institution hereby directed and created, should be perpetual, and that the above mentioned officers for the time being, and their successors, should forever continue and be the governors thereof, and have the superintendence of the same : and it is my will and desire, that if it cannot legally be done, according to my above intention, by them, without an act of the Legislature, it is my will and desire that they will, as soon as possible, apply for an act of the Legislature to incorporate them for the purposes above specified. And I do further declare it to be (my) will and intention, that the said rest, residue, and remainder of my real and personal estate should be, at all events, applied for the uses and purposes above set forth ; and that it is my desire, all courts of law and equity will so construe this, my said Will, as to have the said estate appropriated to the above uses, and that the same should, in no case, for want of legal form or otherwise, be so construed, as that my relations, or any other persons, should heir, possess, or enjoy my property, except in the manner and for the uses herein above specified. And, lastly, I do nominate and appoint the Chancellor of the State of New- York for the time being, at the time of my decease, the Mayor of the city of New York for the time being, the Recorder of the city of New- York for the time being, the President of the Chamber of Commerce for the time being, the President and Vice President of the Marine Society of the city of New-York for the time being, the senior Minister of the Episcopal Church in the city of New- York, and the senior Minister of the Presbyterian Church in the said city, for the time being, and their successors in office after them, to be the executors of this my last Will and Testament.”

Within five years after the death of Robert Randall, the New York legislature, on the application of the trustees who were also the executors of the Will, passed a law that constituted the persons holding the offices named in the Will and their successors as a corporation by the name of “The Trustees of the Sailor’s Snug Harbor” so that they could execute the trust in the Will.

Of course, this novel clause would not go without legal challenge, one that would reach the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99 (1830).  That case and its aftermath will be the subject of Part Three of this story.  Stay tuned!

#AlexanderHamilton #Hamilton #SailorsSnugHarbor

Death and Passwords: Estate Planning for Your Digital Assets, Part 1

If you are reading this, it is because you have Internet access. With Internet access comes a host of services, including online banking, online businesses, and online access to pension savings and other investments.  All of these services require you to create a user name and a password.  Many have challenge questions as well.  What is your plan for these digital assets if you should become incapacitated or die?

With the exception of Oklahoma, state laws that control the disposition of your estate have not been enacted to keep up with this massive societal change in the way we transact our financial lives. For instance, if a family member has given you a power of attorney over their financial affairs, a bank will work with you with respect to their non-virtual accounts. But if that family member schedules payments and transactions through their online account, the power of attorney may be ineffective to gain access to that online account. You must have  at least the password.

But you or your family members may not want to give out passwords to online banking or investment accounts. The possibilities for fraud or mismanagement are large. In addition, many people do not want to reveal the full extent of their financial lives. Access to passwords provide that full view.

On the other hand, there are good reasons to give access to passwords to these trusted sites. Mental incapacity due to illness can rob the individual of the ability to manage their online financial life. At the same time, mental incapacity prevents a person from legally drafting a Will or trust. Thus, estate planning for our digital assets becomes a priority for anyone with anyone who manages their financial life online.

Even if you have a Will, you probably did not make provisions in this document for your digital life. In any case, a Will is not the proper place to list your passwords. If you include your passwords as part of your Will,  a probated Will is   a public document, exposing your digital assets to prying eyes.  These user names, passwords, challenge questions, and other online account identifiers are best protected in a digital assets trust. Trusts, in contrast to Wills, are private documents and a safe way of communicating your online passwords to your trusted family members and advisers.

So who is a candidate for digital asset estate planning? If you can answer “yes” to any of the following questions, then you need an estate plan for your digital assets.

— Do you do online banking?

— Do you regularly schedule payments through your online banking accounts?

— Do you use an online password to access your retirement accounts?

— Do you use an online password to reach your investment accounts?

— Do you have an online business?

— Do you sell items on eBay or other online auction sites?

— Do you have a PayPal account?

— Do you have a business website?

— Do you have a blog or other social media site associated with your business?

In the next part of this series, we will look at why a digital asset trust may be a good solution for your estate planning needs.

If you would like to discuss your own personal situation with me, or how a digital assets estate plan can be tailored to your needs, you can get a free 30-minute consultation simply by filling out this contact form. I will get back to you promptly.

I invite you to join my list of subscribers to this blog by clicking on “Sign me Up” on the left-hand side of the page or the “Subscribe” button at the top of the page so that you can receive a notification when the next blog post has been published.   Thank you.

The Medicaid Five-Year Look-Back Asset Transfer Rules: Avoiding Costly Errors in Long-Term Care Planning

For many people, Medicaid (a joint federal and state program) is their only available source for long-term nursing home care.  For those who can afford it, New York State provides a partnership for long-term care with some participating insurers.  Under this program, the insured person can apply for New York State Medicaid Extended Coverage that allows for either partial or total asset protection from the mandated federal estate recovery provisions described below. Even under this program, income is a factor in determining eligibility.

In 1993 Congress passed legislation requiring States to implement a mandatory estate recovery program for Medicaid recipients over the age of 55.  Three years later, Congress mandated that States set up agencies for the recovery of funds spent on long-term care from people who did not meet eligibility requirements.   Then in 2006 the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA 2005) inaugurated changes in the ineligibility period (or penalty period) to the Medicaid asset transfer rules.  Lawmakers were concerned that some Medicaid participants were meeting their eligibility by shifting assets to their children that would otherwise be used to cover the cost of their care.

To be eligible for long-term care in Medicaid nursing homes or for a community waiver, the person requiring the care must be receiving Social Security and his/her income and assets cannot exceed the income and asset guidelines (note that this chart has not changed for 2011).   DRA 2005 mandates a 60-month look-back period for any evidence of asset transfers, a significant increase from the prior three-year look back period.  If any evidence is found, then the clock for the look-back period will begin at the time of the application for services rather than the date of the asset transfer, a rather stiff penalty.

When contemplating a transfer of assets for the purpose of Medicaid long-term care eligibility, it is important to remember that any asset over which the individual retains control may be used to reimburse Medicaid for nursing home expenses.  And sometimes the best intentions of an individual can be defeated by a residual ownership interest.

Matter of Padulo v Reed presents such a scenario.  Between 1976 and 1994, Ada J. Romeo purchased U.S. savings bonds, naming herself and either her daughter Juliet Padulo or one of Juliet’s children as the bond owners.  On 15 December 2001, Ada gave all her her bonds to Juliet, and Juliet distributed the bonds among herself and her children. 

In 2004 Ada moved to a nursing home.  In the months between July 2004 and February 2005, Juliet cashed out all of the bonds, including those that she had given to her children.   Juliet took the money and put it into a joint account that she held with her husband and her mother.  She used part of the money derived from the sale of the bonds to pay for Ada’s nursing home care.  In September of 2005, Juliet applied for Medicaid benefits on behalf of her mother, thinking that she had met the then three-year look-back period under pre-DRA 2005 rules.  The New York State Department of Health denied the application.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department agreed with the Department of Health.   Because the proceeds from the sale of the bonds were placed in a joint account with Ada, there was a presumption that Ada had full control over the funds and thus that the money belonged to her.  Joint bank accounts also have a right of survivorship, so it would have been possible for Ada to become the sole owner of the account had her daughter and son-in-law predeceased her.   Thus Ada’s transfers to her daughter and grandchildren failed to satisfy the look-back period for Medicaid because she still maintained control over the money.  After Ada’s death, her estate became subject to the federal estate recovery provisions for the cost of her nursing home care.

If you would like to discuss your own personal situation with me, review your current Will, or put together an estate plan that is tailored for your needs, you can get a free 30-minute consultation simply by filling out this contact form. I will get back to you promptly.

I invite you to join my list of subscribers to this blog by clicking on “Sign Me Up!” on the left-hand side of the page so that you can receive a notification when the next installment has been published. Thank you.

A Thanksgiving Checklist as We Count Our Blessings…

More than any other holiday, Thanksgiving is the time when we gather around the table to celebrate with family and friends.  Many of you are traveling to visit your family, and many of you are receiving family and friends for Thanksgiving.  Soon there will be the familiar and anticipated aromas coming from the kitchen and we will gather around the table to enjoy a fabulous meal prepared by loving hands and give thanks for all of our blessings.

This is also the time of year that I suggest for an annual review of your legal life plan because the people you love and want to protect are right there with you.  So this weekend, as you savor the leftovers, ask yourself the following questions.

  • Do I need a Will?
  • If I have a Will, has anything major occured in my life this past year so that I should review it with an attorney?
  • Do I need to look into setting up a trust?
  • Have I reviewed all of my beneficiary designations on such things as life insurance policies and retirement plans?
  • Do I need a living Will?
  • Do I need a Power of Attorney for financial matters?
  • Do I need a Power of Attorney for health care?
  • Do I need a prenuptial agreement?
  • Do I need a postnuptial agreement?
  • Do I need a domestic partnership agreement?

If you would like to discuss your own personal situation with me, review your current legal life plan, or put together a legal life plan that is tailored for your needs, you can get a free 30-minute consultation simply by filling out this contact form. I will get back to you promptly.

From my home to yours, I wish you a very Happy Thanksgiving!  May you and your family continue to be blessed.